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The attribution made by an observer (0) to an actor in the forced 
compliance situation was regarded as a probability revision process 
which can be described by a Bayesian inference model. OS’ per- 
ceptions of the forced compliance situation were analyzed in terms 
of the input components into the Bayesian model: prior probabili- 
ties of the relevant attitudes and the diagnostic values of the be- 
haviors which the actor may choose. In order to test propositions 
made by attribution theory about such perceptions (Kelley, 1967; 
Messick, 1971), OS viewed actors under conditions of Low Induce- 
ment (LI) and High Inducement (HI). Before observing the 
actor’s decision, OS estimated the prior probabilities of the relevant 
attitudes and the conditional probabilities of compliance and re- 
fusal given each of the attitudes. After observing the actor’s de- 
cision, OS estimated the posterior probabilities of the attitudes. As 
expected, in the LI condition, compared to the HI condition, com- 
pliance was seen as less probable and more diagnostic about the 
actor’s attitudes, and the posterior probability of the corresponding 
attitude was higher. Contrary to expectations, within both condi- 
tions, compliance, compared to refusal, was seen as less diagnostic 
and more probable. 
Attribution theory has been reformulated recently in terms of sub- 
jective probability revision by Ajzen (1971) and by Messick (1971). The 
present study elaborates on Ajzen’s and Messick’s approach and uses 
it to predict observers’ inferences about an actor in the forced com- 
pliance situation. 
Attribution theory makes the important assertion that the degree of 
certainty in inferring underlying traits from behavior is inversely related 
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to the behavior’s subjective prior probability. This relationship between 
the likelihood of an act and inference of traits was first suggested by 
Heider ( 1958, p. 169). M ore recently, Jones and Gerard (1967, p. 264) 
derived the same proposition from the assumption that the informational 
value of a behavior is determined by the amount of uncertainty reduced 
by its occurrence. Indeed, in information theory the amount of uncer- 
tainty reduced by a single event is inversely related to its prior prob- 
ability. Kelley (1967) arrived at a similar conclusion in his discussion 
of the consensus criterion in person perception, that is, an observer will 
take an actor’s behavior as a reliable reflection of the latter’s trait to the 
extent that his behavior deviates from what most people would do in 
that situation. Ajzen (1971) provided direct empirical support for these 
notions by obtaining negative correlations between prior behavior prob- 
abilities and measures of trait inference. 
Prior behavior probability is not necessarily the sole determinant of 
trait inference. One can conceive of different situations having the same 
prior behavior probabilities but differing in the number of perceived 
traits causing the behavior or in the degree to which the behavior is 
perceived as equally likely under the various causes. Such situations 
differ, therefore, in the diagnostic value of behavior, i.e., the extent to 
which the behavior is uniquely associated with one of the causes. The 
diagnostic value of a behavior should, in turn, be positively related to the 
certainty with which a trait is inferred. Similar conclusions are implied 
in Kelley’s (1971) contention that a given cause will be inferred with 
relatively little certainty when a behavior is perceived to have multiple 
plausible causes. Equivalently, Jones and Davis (1965) argued that 
the smaller the overlap between the possible causes of behavior and 
those of other behaviors, and the smaller the number of causes unique 
to a behavior, the higher the confidence in inferring a given cause. 
FinalIy, Ajzen (1971) has drawn attention to the constraining roIe of 
the prior probability of a trait. That is, confidence in a trait after ob- 
serving behavior is positively related to amount of confidence in the 
trait before observing the behavior. 
These considerations imply that trait attribution can be regarded as a 
product of a rational inferential process. Indeed, Kelley (1971) stated: “It 
is proposed that our theory of attribution must be grounded in a view 
of the layman as an applied scientist.” This suggests that a normative 
model such as Bayesian inference theory (Edwards, Lindman, and 
Phillips, 1965) might serve fruitfully as a model of the trait inference 
process. In the discrete Bayes’ model, we let P( Ti ) denote the prior prob- 
ability” of a trait belonging to a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of 
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traits, T,, . , . , Ti, . . . , T,, and let P( Bj ) d enote the prior probabilities of 
a behavior belonging to a mutuahy exclusive and exhaustive set of be- 
haviors, B,, . . . , Bj, . . . , B,,,. The behaviors are linked to the traits through 
P( BjJTi)‘s which specify the conditional probability of Bj given Ti. 
Finally, if P( TiIBj) d enotes the probability of Ti contingent on observing 
Bj. Bayes’ theorem states that 
(1) 
where 
P(Bj) = 1 P(Ti)P(BiITi), 
m 
and c 
P(BjITi) = 1.0. 
i=l j=l 
For a set including two traits, T, and TS, equation (1) can be expressed 
for T, and TB, respectively. Then, division of equation (1) for T, by 
the same equation in terms of T, yields: 
P(TllBj) P(Tl)P(BjITl) =- -. 
PU”zIBJ P(T,)P(Bj(T?) 
(2) 
Equation (2) can be stated more simply as 
~1 = Q&R(Bj), 
where 
(3) 
Q _ WI) 
’ PW,) 
is the subjective odds in favor of T, prior to observing Bj, 
is the odds posterior to observing Bj, and 
is the likelihood ratio of the two conditional probabilities associated with 
Bj. Taking logarithms in Equation (3)) we have the following additive 
inference model: 
log 521 = log CL, + log LR(BJ. (4) 
It can be seen that the model incorporates quantitatively the considera- 
‘In this paper such concepts as probability, likelihood, likelihood ratio, and odds 
will stand for their respective subjective counterparts from the observer’s point of 
view. 
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tions specified by attribution theory in its analysis of trait inference, to 
wit: posterior trait probability is inversely related to prior behavior 
probability; the impact of observed behavior depends on the degree to 
which it distinguishes between the possible traits, i.e., its diagnostic 
value LR( Bj ) ; and the posterior trait probability depends on its prior 
probability. 
The fit between observers’ trait inferences and those predicted by 
Bayes’ theorem which was reported by Ajzen (1971) as well as a theo- 
retical analysis by Messick (1971) have already demonstrated the model’s 
usefulness. For our purposes, Messick’s (1971) discussion of the asym- 
metric certainty principle is of particular interest. Suppose an observer 
considers two equally likely traits, T, and T,, and two behaviors, B, and 
B2, which are behavioral manifestations of T, and T2, respectively. It is 
assumed that P( B, IT,) approaches certainty, i.e., it is close to unity, and 
that P(B,(T,) = S. Since 
2 
c 
P(BjlTi) = 1, 
j=l 
P( B,IT,) is close to zero, and P( B,/T,) = 1 - S. Fig. 1, adapted with 
some modifications from Messick ( 1971), illustrates the stochastic rela- 
tions involved. 
If B, occurs, the posterior odds in favor of T, equal 1.0/S, i.e., B, does 
not lead to a certain inference. If B, occurs, however, the posterior odds 
in favor of T, equal (1 - S) /O (infinity), i.e., T, is inferred with cer- 
tainty. Messick suggested that these stochastic contingencies are an 
idealized model of attribution processes in several experiments on trait 
inference. In such experiments, the situation from the observer’s point 
of view is structured so that there is an external pressure omn the actor to 
choose, say, B, rather than B, (e.g., Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961). Be- 
Traits Behaviors 
P(T,) = .5 Pm,) = .5 + 3 
PO*) = .5 P(B2) = -5 - $ 
FIG. 1. Graphical illustration of the asymmetric certainty principle. 
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cause of the situational pressure, B, may be produced both by actors POS- 
sessing T, and by actors possessing T,. In the first case, there is no reason 
why a person possessing the trait T, (which is congruent with behavior Bl) 
and who is under pressure to behave so will not produce B,, i.e., P( B,IT,) 
= 1.0. In the second case, because of the external pressure, there is some 
probability, P( B,/T2) = S, that a person possessing T, will inaccurately 
present himself by B,. The occurrence of B, (e.g., “in-role” behavior) 
therefore leaves it ambiguous as to whether the actor possesses T, to T,. 
The occurrence of B, (e.g., “out-of-role” behavior) can be explained 
only by invoking T 2, since the subjective probability that it was pro- 
duced by an actor possessing T, is close to zero. In other words, the 
diagnostic value of B, is higher than that of B,. 
The “interpersonal simulation” of the forced compliance paradigm 
(Bern, 1972) is one of the trait inference situations which has attracted 
much attention in recent years. The present study makes use of the same 
paradigm. In this case, observers’ (OS’) inferences will be analyzed in 
terms of the theoretical notions developed in the preceding discussion. 
For our purposes we will assume that, for example, in Bern’s (1965) 
“interpersonal simulation” of Cohen’s (1962) study OS had to infer 
whether the actor is in favor (T,, pro) or against (T,, anti) police in- 
tervention on campus. We wiII also assume that he considers two possi- 
bIe behaviors: compliance (B, ) and refusal (B,) with the experimenter’s 
request to take a pro position. The question is what a priori probabilistic 
structure simulates OS’ perception of the forced compliance situation. 
Kelley’s ( 1967) attributional analysis of the forced compliance situation 
employed by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) is relevant here. KeIIey 
argued that OS’ judgment of an inverse relation between inducement 
magnitude and attitude inference “is probably associated with as- 
sumptions (unchecked in Bern’s work, as far as I know) that there is a 
distribution of opinion toward the task, and only the more favorable 
subjects complied in the $1 case and almost all, favorable or not, com- 
plied in the $20 case” (Kelley, 1967, p. 226). Consider the implications 
of this argument for the High Inducement (HI) condition. First. P( 8, ) > 
P( B2), as in Fig. 1. Second, the assumption that OS expect both pro and 
anti actors to comply implies that both P( B, IT, ) and P( B, IT,) are high, 
The former is probably close to unity and higher than the latter which 
can be assumed to equal S. It follows that P( B,JT, ) is near zero and that 
P(B,IT,) = 1 - S. Th 1 us, excluding the prior trait probability distribu- 
tion, which is probably biased in favor of T?, all these likelihoods are 
represented in Fig. 1. Thus, according to this analysis, the HI condition 
can be regarded as a situation of asymmetric certainty. As to the Low 
Inducement (LI) condition, Kelley’s analysis seems to imply that, due 
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to the absence of salient external pressure, actors are expected to be- 
have more in keeping with their attitudes, that is, both P( B,IT,) and 
P( B,JT,) are high. This proposition in conjunction with the assumption 
that P( T,) < P( Tr) imply that in the LI condition P( B,) < P( B,), i.e., 
only few actors are expected to comply. 
To summarize, the preceding analysis suggests that in the LI condi- 
tion, compared to the HI condition, compliance has a lower prior prob- 
ability and a higher diagnostic value. Therefore, compliance should 
produce a higher posterior probability of the corresponding attitude in 
the LI than in the HI condition. Furthermore, according to the anaIysis, 
within the HI condition, higher prior probability and a lower diagnostic 
value are associated with compliance than with refusal; within the LI 
condition, the prior probability of compliance is lower than that of 
refusal, but refusal and compliance do not differ in diagnostic value. 
The present study will subject these propositions to direct test by 
obtaining from OS, before they observe the actor’s choice, the likelihoods 
which serve as input into the Bayesian model. Attitude inference will be 
assessed by obtaining from OS attitude probabilities, after they observe 
the actor’s choice. 
METHOD 
Observers. Sixty-four undergraduates at The University of Michigan, all drawn 
from the psychology subject pool, served as observers. Participation in the experi- 
ment fulfilled a course requirement. 
Design. OS were exposed to either a HI or a LI procedure. Within each induce- 
ment condition, each of four groups of OS viewed one of four different actors. 
Thus, a 2 x 4 nested classification design was formed with actors nested within 
inducement magnitude levels. Eight OS were randomly assigned to each of the 
eight experimental conditions. 
Procedure. OS, in groups of eight, were given the following instructions: 
This study is designed to determine how accurately people can judge 
another person on the basis of his behavior. You will receive a description 
of an experiment which took place in this laboratory and in which student K 
participated. The description will be divided into two parts. The first 
will be a written one and the second will be a recorded video tape film. 
Some of the judgments you will be asked to make will be in the form of 
probability estimates which will be commpared to those given by a mathe- 
matical equation. We will start, therefore, with a practice problem in order 
to familiarize you with such estimates. 
As practice the “book bags and poker chips” problem was used (see Peterson & 
Miller, 1965). Following information about the number and composition of each type 
of bag, but before knowing the result of a simulated draw, 0s were asked to 
estimate the prior probabilities of each type of bag and the conditional pr&ab&ies 
of each kind of chip given the various types of bags. At this point, 0s were given 
explanations of the meaning of probability estimation and were encourag& to ask 
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questions. After the result of the simulated draw had been told, OS were asked to 
estimate posterior probabilities of each type of bag. 
An experiment, similar in general outline to that reported by Helmreich and 
Collins ( 1968), was then described. OS received a booklet beginning with a 
description of student K who belonged to the subject poo1 and who was called to 
the lab in order to fill out a self report personality questionnaire (Rotter’s, 
1966 I-E scale). The booklet continued with the procedure Helmreich and Collins 
used to administer the questionnaire and to explain its nature. OS then read in the 
description that E added: 
“It is our routine to ask for subjects’ consent to take questionnaires 
which include questions about various aspects of their personaIity. Are you 
willing to answer this questionnaire?” 
The text indicated that K agreed and that he worked on the questionnaire for 
15 minutes. OS were asked to read the questionnaire which was given in the next 
page in the booklet. The text then continued as follows: 
After K completed the questionnaire, the experimenter thanked him 
for participating in the research and added: 
“I would like you to fill out the ‘Subject’s Report on Psychology Experi- 
ments’ questionnaire which is administered to all subjects participating 
in psychological experiments in order to get their reactions to and evalua- 
tions of the experiments. (Note. This questionnaire is given in the next 
page. From the description you were given, estimate as well as you can K’s 
reactions to and evaluations of the experiment.)” 
The items in the questionnaire were applicable to any psychology experiment. 
Among fill in items, two dealt with perceived freedom. The first asked: “How much 
choice do you fee1 you had to turn down the experimenter’s request to perform the 
experimental task?” The second asked: “If you were asked about your opinions, how 
much freedom do you feel you had to express your true opinions?” A T-point scale 
accompanied both questions. Both scales ranged from absolutely no choice to 
absolute freedom of choice. 
Another question asked for estimates of prior probabilities of agreeing and re- 
fusing to perform the tasks. “Imagine 100 typical students in this situation, how 
many do you think would agree to do the task you just did and how many would 
refuse? In front of each of these alternatives below, place the number of students 
who would choose it. Please make sure that your estimates sum to 100, so that you 
have accounted for all 100 students. 
students out of 100 typical students would agree. 
-- students out of 100 typical students would refuse.” 
The text then continued as follows: 
While K worked on this questionnaire another experimenter entered the 
room and said that he would like to talk to the subject for a moment after 
he finished. When K completed the questionnaire he followed the second 
experimenter to another room. (Note. From this point the procedure was 
recorded and it will be shown to you on this monitor.) 
Each of the eight groups of OS viewed a different video tape. These video tapes 
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were obtained in a previous study (Trope, 1971) in which actual inducement to and 
performance of a counter attitudinal behavior was recorded. All tapes were of male 
subjects. Special care was taken to assure that the tapes were similar in such charac- 
teristics as length and quality of the counter attitudinal behavior, amount of willing- 
ness expressed in compliance, and technical quality of the recording. 
The video tape showed E and K entering the room and E was heard saying: 
“I am preparing materials to be used in research with an experimental section of a 
psychology class which meets in an electronically equipped classroom, and I need 
your help for a few minutes. The research is on attitude change, and a number of 
communications will be presented to the students to see if their opinions can be 
altered. I would like you to make a video tape forcefully stating arguments in favor 
of keeping intelligence files on potentially subversive students. I prepared four 
general arguments in favor of keeping files on potentially subversive students, and 
you can add more arguments. You simply have to state your name, home town, class, 
and major, and present the arguments. We are interested in the long term effects 
of a communication on attitudes. So, we plan to measure their attitude right after 
we play the tape and again at the end of the semester. Because of this, it is 
extremely important that you not tell anyone what you really think about the issue 
or why you made the tape before the end of the semester.” 
In the LI condition, E continued: “Since you just finished an experiment, you 
completed the subject pool requirements for today, and it is up to you whether 
to do it or not. Can you help us out?” 
In the HI condition, the E continued: “Since the experiment you just finished 
took only 15 minutes, and you were called for an hour, your subject pool require- 
ments for today may be considered incomplete if you do not participate in this 
research. But it is up to you whether you do it or not. Can you help us out?’ 
The replay was stopped at this point, prior to K’s answer. OS returned to the 
text and answered the questions asking for estimates of the prior probabilities which 
constitute the input to Bayes’ formula. The general format of these questions was 
similar to that used by Ajzen ( 1971). The first question asked for prior trait prob- 
abilities P( Ti ), “Out of 100 typical students, how many do you think are in favor 
of keeping intelligence files on potentially subversive students, and how many are 
against keeping files on potentially subversive students? Place your estimates in the 
appropriate spaces below. Please make sure that your estimates sum to 100 so that 
you have accounted for all 100 students. 
Out of 100 typical students, ~ students are in favor of keeping files 
on potentially subversive students, and -- students are against keeping 
files on potentially subversive students.” 
The second and third questions asked for prior conditional probabilities, P( B, ITI) 
and P( Bj/T2). respectively. The second question asked: “Out of 100 students who 
are in favor of keeping files on potentially subversive students, how many do you 
think would agree in this situation to make the video tape presentation and how 
many would refuse? In front of each alternative below, place the number of these 
students who would choose the alterantive in this situation. Please make sure that 
your estimates sum to 100, so that you have accounted for all 100 students, 
Out of 100 students who are in favor of keeping files on potentially subver- 
sive students, __ students would agree, and __ students would refuse.” 
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The third question was identical to the second except that “in favor” was replaced 
by “against.” 
After OS had completed these questions, the video tape replay continued. K was 
seen agreeing to make the presentation, preparing it, and then presenting it. Follow- 
ing the presentation, OS returned to the text where they answered the question asking 
for estimates of posterior trait probability, P( Ti /B%). “In view of his choice, what 
are the chances that K is in favor of or against keeping intelligence files on potentially 
subversive students? Choose numbers between 0 and 100 to represent how likely 
you think it is that K is in favor of or against keeping files on potentially subversive 
students. Place your estimates in the appropriate spaces below. Again, please make 
sure that your estimates sum to 100. 
The chances are - in 100 that K is in favor of keeping files on potentially 
subversive students, and - in 100 that K is against keeping files on po- 
tentially subversive students.” 
OS then continued reading the text. They were told that E gave K a question- 
naire which he intended to use in his study and asked him to fill it out so that he 
could see how long it takes, get suggestions for improvement, and know how K 
feeIs about the issue. In addition to questions asking for evaluations of the presenta- 
tion, the questionnaire included the following item: “Intelligence files should be 
kept on potentially subversive students.” A ‘I-point scale ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree followed this statement. OS were given the questionnaire 
and were asked to indicate in it their estimates of K’s opinion. Finally, 0s were told 
that E asked K to fill out the ‘Subject Report on Psychology Experiments’ question- 
naire. OS were asked again to estimate K’s reactions to and evaluations of the task 
he performed with the second E. 
RESULTS 
Subjective Prior Probabilities 
The reIevant variables for the analysis of O’s perception of the forced 
compliance situation, prior to observing the compliant act, were based 
on the input components into Bayes’ theorem, i.e., subjective prior trait 
( attitude) probabilities, P( Ti ) , and subjective conditional behavior prob- 
abilities, P( Bj\Ti). The first six columns in Table 1 present the means 
of these probabilities and of several indices derived from Bayes’ theorem 
which manipulate these probabilities. (These indices are described be- 
low.) Also presented are F ratios for the main effects of inducement 
magnitude obtained from two-way analyses of variance in which in- 
ducement magnitude and actors (nested within inducement magnitude 
levels) served as factors.4 
’ In all analyses of variance, the main effect of actors did not reach the .25 level 
of significance. Therefore, the actors and the within cell mean squares were pooled 
to provide a single residual term. Since actors are nested within inducement magni- 
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Column 1 in Table 1 gives the probability of an attitude in favor of 
keeping files on potentially subversive students, P( T,). The prob- 
ability of an attitude against keeping files on potentially subversive stu- 
dents, P( T,), is the complement of P( T,). It appears that the prior 
probability distribution over attitudes was biased in favor of T, and that 
the LI and HI conditions did not differ in this respect. 
As expected, P( B,/T,), the probability that students in favor of files 
will comply (Column 2), was rather high in both inducement condi- 
tions. It was significantly higher, however, in the HI than in the LI condi- 
tion, Column 3, contrary to expectations, reveals that even in the LI 
condition a considerable proportion of the students who oppose files are 
expected to comply. A comparison between columns 2 and 3 suggests 
that the difference between the two experimental conditions was more 
pronounced for the behavior probabilities conditional on T, (i.e., on 
the probabilities of compliance and refusal by students who are against 
files, P(B,(T,) and P(B,(T,), respectively) than for the corresponding 
behavior probabilities conditional on T, (i.e., P( B,IT, ) and P( B,/T,), 
respectively). Thus, P( B,/T,) < P( B,(T,) in the LI condition while the 
opposite holds for the HI condition. On the other hand, P( B,IT,) > 
P( B,/T,) in both the LI and HI conditions. To explore further these 
results, a three-way analysis of variance was conducted with the likeli- 
hoods P(B,jT,) and P( B,/T,) as a within Ss factor, in addition to the 
factors of inducement magnitude and actors. A significant interaction 
between inducement magnitude and type of likelihood was obtained 
(F( 1,62) = 13.96, p < 605). This resuIt reflected the larger difference 
between the two experimental conditions on P( B, IT,) than on P( B,IT, ). 
The same results would have been obtained, of course, with P(B,(T,) 
and P( B,JT,). 
From the likelihoods given by OS, Bayesian log likelihood ratios associ- 
ated with compliance and refusal were computed for each 0 as follows: 
respectively. BLLR( Bj ) represents the impact a given behavior should 
have on the prior odds, i.e., the perceived diagnostic value of a given 
behavior. As predicted, the diagnostic value of compliance (Table 1, 
column 4) was higher in the LI than in the HI condition. Column 5 
indicates that the experimental conditions did not differ in the diagnostic 
value of refusal. It was also hypothesized that within the HI condition 
the diagnostic value of refusal will be higher than that of compliance and 
that within the LI condition compliance and refusal will have similar 
diagnostic values. The results in columns 5 and 6 lend support to the 
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first part of the prediction but disconfirm the second. More specifically, 
in both conditions refusal was more diagnostic than compliance. (In the 
HI condition, t(31) = 6.1, p < .005; in the LI condition, t (31) = 3.82, 
p < 605.) 
With regard to prior behavior probabilities, it was predicted that the 
prior probability of compliance, P( B,), will be higher in the HI than in 
the LI condition. This probabihty was estimated as follows: 
The data in Table 1, column 6 strongly confirm this hypothesis. How- 
ever, the hypothesis that P( BI ) > P( B,) in the HI condition and that 
P(B,) < P(B,) in the LI condition was only partially supported. In 
both conditions P( B,) > P( B?) (but P( B,) was significantly greater 
than 0.5 only in the HI condition). (In the HI condition t = 10.6, p < 
.005; in the LI condition t = 1.4.) 
Subjective Posterior Probabilities 
Column 7 in Table 1 presents the posterior trait probability that the 
actor is in favor of keeping files, P( T,IB,). As expected, following ob- 
servation of compliance, the posterior probability of the corresponding 
attitude was higher in the LI condition than in the HI condition. In both 
conditions, however, this probability did not exceed 5. In other words, 
observers believed that it is more likely that the actor was “drawn” from 
the population which opposes keeping files than from the population 
which favors files. 
From O’s posterior trait probabilities, posterior odds were computed, 
i.e., fit, = P(T,/B,)/P(T,IB,). The log of these posterior odds, log R~, 
and the log of the prior odds, log R,, were used to obtain a subjective log 
likelihood ratio for each 0 as follows: SLLR = logn, - log& SLLR rep- 
resents the actual impact of observed behavior on the O’s prior opinion; 
it is a function of the ratio by which the prior odds were actually revised 
into posterior odds (Phillips & Edwards, 1966). Mean values of SLLR 
are presented in column 8. It is apparent that the actual revision of 
opinion in light of compliance was more pronounced in the LI than in the 
HI condition. In order to test the usefulness of Bayes’ theorem as a de- 
scriptive model, the correlation between SLLR and BLLR was computed. 
Recall that BLLR is the diagnostic value which 0s assign to the behavior; 
therefore, it represents the diagnostic impact that sllozcld be associated 
with observation of the behavior. This correlation reflects then the degree 
to which the impact of observed behavior on O’s prior opinions fits the 
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impact the behavior would have had on the prior opinion of an optimal 
Bayesian information processor. Over all experimental conditions, the 
correlation between SLLR and BLLR was .48, significant at the .Ol level. 
OS’ ratings of the actor’s attitude favorability were consistent with 
the probabilistic estimates. The mean ratings in the LI and HI condi- 
tions were 3.18 and 2.36, respectively (F = 6.15, p < .05). Also, ratings 
of the actor’s freedom (the sum of O’s responses to the questions asking 
about the actor’s freedom to turn down the experimenter’s request and 
to express his true opinion) were higher in the LI condition (7.16) than 
in the HI condition (5.28) (F = 14.11, p < ,005). 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, the inference of an actor’s attitude from his behavior 
in a forced compliance situation was regarded as a process of revision 
in opinion in light of new information. Bayes’ theorem was used as a 
model of this attribution process. According to the model, O’s initial 
knowledge about an actor with regard to a given set of traits can be 
expressed in terms of a prior probability distribution over the traits. 
Furthermore, O’s perception of an actor in a situation also includes a set 
of conditional probabilities of the various possible behaviors given the 
various traits considered. For two traits (or subsets of traits), it is 
assumed that the prior trait probabilities give rise to prior odds, i.e., the 
ratio of the two trait probabilities, and that the set of conditional behavior 
probabilities give rise to a likelihood ratio for each behavior, i.e., a ratio 
of the probability of the behavior under one trait to the probability of the 
behavior under the other trait. The model states that the amount of 
revision from prior to posterior odds (or their logarithms) justified by 
the observation of a behavior is specified by the likelihood ratio (or 
its logarithm) associated with the behavior, i.e., its diagnostic value. 
The significance of the model is mainly that it identifies dimensions 
(the input components into Bayes’ theorem) in terms of which the per- 
ceived stochastic structures of a situation can be analyzed. These 
dimensions were used in the present study for the analysis of the OS’ 
perception of the forced compliance situation. The attributional analysis 
of the forced compliance situation (Kelley, 1967) served as a general 
framework for the simulation of OS’ perceptions along these dimensions. 
Messick’s ( 1971) model of asymmetric certainty (which paralleh Kelley’s 
analysis) was taken as a first approximation to O’s perception of the HI 
condition. Hence, compliance was expected to be more probable and 
less diagnostic than refusal. The hypotheses about the LI condition were 
derived from the assumption that OS perceive this situation as allowing 
actors to behave in manners which express their attitudes. Accordingly, 
14 YAACOV TROPE 
since the attitude which is congruous with compliance was assumed to 
have low prior probability, the probability of compliance was expected to 
be lower than that of refusal. Also, both compliance and refusal were ex- 
pected to have high diagnostic values. 
The results clearly supported the expectations about the HI condition. 
It seems then, that the asymmetric certainty model is a useful approxi- 
mation to OS’ perception of this situation. However, the hypothesized 
effects under the LI condition were not obtained. The results indicate 
that compliance is at least as probable and less diagnostic than refusal. 
In terms of Kelley’s analysis, OS did not seem to expect that only few 
actors would comply and did not believe that only those who hold the 
corresponding attitude would comply. OS seemed to expect that many 
actors would comply and that a considerable proportion of those who 
possess the incongruous attitude would comply. In principle, it should be 
possible to create a LI condition where only the few actors possessing the 
congruous attitude are expected to comply. The results of the present 
study, however, raise doubts whether the LI condition in the typical 
forced compliance experiment actually does produce such expectations 
in OS. Stated otherwise, it may be difficult to devise a situation in which, 
on one hand, all actors, regardless of their attitudes, actually comply, but 
in which, on the other hand, OS expect only those possessing a particular 
attitude to comply. 
Most hypotheses which are restricted to comparisons between the in- 
ducement conditions were supported. Thus, the perceived probability 
of compliance was higher in the HI than in the LI condition. To use 
Kelley’s terminology, OS entertained the quite unwarranted assumption 
of differential rates of compliance in the two conditions. Furthermore, 
as expected, compliance was considered as more diagnostic in the LI than 
in the HI condition. However, the parallel tendency to perceive refusal 
as more diagnostic in the HI than in the LI condition was not un- 
equivocally demonstrated. In sum, in “reality” the diagnostic values 
of compliance in the LI and HI conditions to not differ-in both they 
are very small (nearly all actors comply in both conditional). OS there- 
fore overestimated the diagnostic value of compliance, or underestimated 
the external pressures, in the LI condition in particular. OS thus also 
exaggerated the difference between the two conditions. They did so, 
however, to a smaller extent than that expected under current attribu- 
tional analyses of OS’ perception of the forced compliance situation. 
Coming to the attributions made after observing compliance, 0s were 
more confident in inferring the corresponding attitude in the LI than in 
the HI condition. This was shown in terms of posterior trait probabilities 
as well as in terms of subjective log likelihood ratios, i.e.. the actual 
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diagnostic impact of observed behavior on the initial opinion. lt should 
be noted that in both conditions, in spite of observing compliance, 0s 
still believed that the actor is less likely to hold the corresponding at& 
tude than the other attitude. The relevance of the input components 
and of the Bayesian rule for their combination to the attribution process 
was demonstrated by the significant correlations between Bayes’ theorem 
prescriptions and OS’ inferences. 
Finally, the attribution literature places a strong emphasis on the 
role of overall prior behavior probabihties in trait inference. In this study, 
the concept of diagnostic value of behavior was emphasized. One may 
question the value of such a concept since in the present study behavior 
probabilities were related (inversely) to behavior’s diagnostic values 
and to posterior trait probabilities. It should be clear, however, that, 
mathematically at least, behavior’s diagnostic value and overall probability 
are independent. Behavior probability can be, say, high and its diagnostic- 
ity can be either high or low. ,411 experimental manipulation of these two 
factors in an orthogonal fashion is suggested by this analysis as an in- 
teresting possibility for future research. 
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